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OCTOBER
2007 :: COVER STORY : ECONOMICS
Subprime
Time
Behind the Scenes of the Credit
Crunch
Why is the crisis
in subprime lending happening? And why is it a big deal?
To answer this,
it helps to understand how the mortgage market connects with other
financial markets, and why subprime loans-loans that target homebuyers
with shaky credit histories or little savings-even exist.
A conventional
home mortgage is a contract between a borrower and a lender. The
lender agrees to lend a homebuyer a certain sum of money, say, 80%
of the purchase price of a home. The home buyer agrees to pay back
the loan, plus interest, in regular monthly installments over a
specified period of time. The borrower also pledges to forfeit the
house to the lender if he cannot repay the loan. The amount of the
loan, the interest rate (which can be fixed or fluctuating), the
repayment term and the collateral are all spelled out in the mortgage
contract. Once the home purchase is closed, the buyer gets the keys
to the house, and the lender can count on receiving a steady stream
of monthly interest and principal payments over the next 30 years,
hoping that the borrower doesn't default.
But the lender
also has some other options. For instance, it can sell the loan.
That means it transfers the mortgage contract to another company,
giving that company the right to collect those monthly interest
and principal payments. In exchange, it accepts a lump-sum payment.
Selling a loan can be a highly attractive option. It allows the
lender to pocket all the fees it collected from the borrower when
it made the loan, while it largely escapes the risk of the borrower
defaulting on the loan later on. And it now has more money available
to lend to other borrowers. This is the key incentive for subprime
lenders to make loans that would otherwise be considered too risky.
Who buys these
loans, and why would they do so? Subprime lenders lately have been
reselling loans in bulk to Wall Street banks. The bankers, in turn,
pool large batches of loans together and convert them into interest-paying
bonds that can be sold to investors. Once again, the Wall Street
banks get paid upfront (rather than waiting 30 years), and the risk
of default is shifted and dispersed to the millions of investors
who buy the bonds.
In recent years,
such "mortgage-backed" bonds have attracted investors
from all over the world, because they have paid investors a better
interest rate than other comparable bonds. Although each of the
bonds represents many small, risky mortgage loans, the investors
care much more about the overall qualities of the bonds-things like
the average credit score-than the credit profiles of the individual
home-loan borrowers.
Among the most
active investors in these bonds have been "hedge funds,"
private investor pools that manage money for wealthy, sophisticated
investors. Hedge funds invest enormous sums, but they, too, rely
heavily on bank loans to help finance those investments, expecting
to pay back the big loans with even bigger investment profits. So
in effect, the money that a subprime home buyer borrows for his
home is really coming from a bank that is several steps removed
from the transaction.
And this is
where things have gotten messy lately.
For several
years, hedge funds were performing very well, and were able to invest
more and more money into mortgage-backed bonds, which, down the
line, made more money available for subprime lenders and, ultimately,
home buyers. But amid the recent troubles in the housing market-with
flattening home prices and rising loan delinquencies-many of those
investments have gone sour. Now, hedge funds are having trouble
getting capital from banks to fund their investments in mortgage-backed
bonds. With less demand for the bonds, Wall Street banks are less
inclined to buy up loans from subprime lenders. And that leaves
subprime mortgage companies with more risk on their hands and less
money to lend. Many subprime lenders have gone out of business.
In this way,
the trouble in the housing market spreads all the way up to banks
and investors who have little connection to or knowledge about their
borrowers. And the resulting squeeze on capital trickles all the
way back down to lenders, homeowners and prospective buyers, making
it especially difficult for subprime borrowers to get new loans
or refinance their old ones.
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