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ARCHIVES
:: MAY 2002 ::
COVER STORY
Are
Department
Stores Dying?
By
JEFFREY A. TRACHTENGERG
And ANN ZIMMERMAN
Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal
In
past decades, department stores attracted consumers by offering them
atmosphere, attentive service and a wide variety of merchandise
under one roof. And they still account for much of retailing’s
romance—its parades and pageants, its Santa Lands and window
dressing. Department stores were where ambitious retail executives
wanted to work, and where fashion-minded customers wanted to shop.
But
for a growing number of consumers, department stores aren’t
romantic or convenient anymore. They are time-consuming and
difficult—difficult to get to, difficult to navigate, difficult to
get help in and difficult to get out of. And, for all that
inconvenience, they typically charge higher prices than Target or
Wal-Mart—discounters that are increasingly challenging them in
selection and convenience—or even Kohl’s.
“Department
stores are just overwhelming and dull,” says Mary Jane Van de
Castle, a 42-year-old beauty-salon owner in Shawnee Mission, Kan.
“I like to go to a store where I’m interested in most of the
merchandise.”
That
explains why department stores have fallen on such hard times. As a
group, they have been losing market share for years, and those
losses appear to be accelerating. Sales at established
department-store outlets are declining, even as discount retailers
rack up gains. Traditional chains such as J.C. Penney and
Dillard’s are planning few, if any, new stores, while their
nemesis, Kohl’s, a hybrid discount department-store company, plans
to open 70 stores this year alone.
Department-store
executives know they need to turn those trends around, lest the
industry go the way of five-and-dime stores. Largely unable to
devise new ways of boosting sales, much of the industry remains
fixated on a years-old cost-cutting strategy: consolidation.
Recently, executives of Federated Stores and May Co. talked about a
possible merger, though the talks didn’t go anywhere.
The
industry’s past reliance on consolidation, however, has
contributed to many of its current woes. The mergers transformed a
legion of regional merchants, all focused on their specific
customers, into a handful of nearly identical national
department-store chains focused on pleasing shareholders. In the
quest for fatter profits, department stores cut sales staff, allowed
stores to deteriorate and introduced goods designed to appeal to the
masses.
“They
cut what made them attractive,” says Arnold Aronson, a retail
consultant. “Great assortment, presentation, better-than-average
service, the exclusivity they tried to achieve—all has declined
over the past decade.”
Hard
Times
Department
stores, which now account for 10.9% of the nation’s retail sales,
still have some distinct advantages over their discount- and
specialty-store rivals. Most notably, they offer designer brands,
such as Polo and Tommy Hilfiger, found almost nowhere else (Related
article on Page 10).
And
some of their present difficulties are attributable to the economic
slowdown. Excluding automobiles, overall retail sales in 2001
increased only 2.4% from a year earlier to $855.6 billion—barely
keeping pace with inflation.
But
even amid the recession, other types of retailers are thriving.
Specialty retailers Chico’s FAS and Bed, Bath & Beyond had
2001 same-store sales increases of 17.1% and 4.5%, respectively.
(Same-store sales exclude stores that have been open less than a
year.) At Target and Kohl’s, same-store sales rose a respective
4.1% and 6.8% last year.
Much
of those gains have come at the expense of department stores, as
discounters and specialty retailers begin to offer shoppers more
alternatives than ever. Department stores’ share of the apparel
market has fallen to 40% from 70% two decades ago, says market
researcher Chris Ohlinger. Over the same period, their share has
fallen to about 5% of the home-electronics market from 25%, and to
less than 5% of the furniture market from 40%.
Turnaround
Strategies
Can
the traditional department store reverse its decline? Each of the
big chains thinks so, and each also has its own strategy. To combat
discounters, Nordstrom is trimming some prices. For example, it
recently lowered its price on a pair of men’s khaki pants to
$39.50 from $47.50 and found that the decision boosted unit volume
by 43%. Neiman Marcus, by contrast, is holding the line on prices.
“Luxury is not dead,” says Burt Tansky, Neiman’s chief
executive officer. Saks, meanwhile, says it is cutting prices mainly
on brands that discounters also carry, such as Levi’s. Otherwise,
it is moving to re-emphasize both private-label and designer brands
not found at discounters.
May
Co., whose stable includes Lord & Taylor and several other
regional chains, is aiming its growth strategy specifically at
brides as a way of attracting younger shoppers. Federated, which
owns Macy’s and Bloomingdale’s, plans to exploit its strong
suit—selling clothing for young women—by jazzing up its young
women’s departments with music and placing the young men’s
department nearby, to create some buzz between the sexes. Federated
also plans to move its young women’s departments to the front of
its stores, where possible. “One thing we’ve learned about
younger customers is that they don’t want to walk past their
mother’s hosiery department,” says Terry Lundgren, Federated’s
president.
Indeed,
a serious challenge for department stores is that fewer and fewer
customers want to walk past departments irrelevant to their mission.
That’s why shoppers are visiting specialty stores that offer
exactly what they want—toys, electronics, teen girls’ wear and
so on. It also is why freestanding stores are displacing malls as
the hottest retail real estate. Shoppers want to drive up, run in
and run out. Within malls, department stores—long courted as
“anchor tenants”—now receive less traffic than some specialty
stores.
“I
don’t shop at department stores, because I don’t do malls. I
don’t have the time,” says Robin Kessler, a North Dallas working
mother with three active teenagers. “I like stores in strip
centers, because I just want to drive up to a store, get what I need
and get the hell out.”
Considering
that department stores began as one-stop shopping centers in the
pre-automotive era, it is ironic that inconvenience is the largest
factor in their decline. But early in their history, department
stores evolved into social and entertainment centers for women with
money and time to spare, who would drift from floor to floor,
pausing for lunch in the store restaurant. In fact, department
stores typically offered minimal signage, hoping that lost shoppers
would stumble upon items they hadn’t intended to buy. But today,
few shoppers have any patience for getting lost.
The
Meaning of Service
Some
department stores are trying to address these problems. Saks last
year tested central cash registers in 100 stores, and the experiment
worked so well that it is replicating it across all of its 243
traditional department stores. A similar strategy is under way at a
73-store chain called Bon-Ton. “The customer wants to come in,
find what she wants, and get out,” says Mary Kerr, spokeswoman.
“That’s the meaning of customer service these days.”
Few
chains are moving to redefine themselves more aggressively than
Sears, once seen as the quintessential department store. After an
ultimately ill-fated emphasis on fashion, Sears has decided to
exploit its merchandising strengths, particularly its store-brand
hard goods, such as Craftsman tools and Kenmore appliances. Sears
also is introducing centralized checkout counters and simplified
floor plans designed to make merchandise more visible from a
distance.
As
a result, Sears’s stock is soaring. Just don’t call it a
department store. “We’re not a discounter, and we don’t want
to be. We also don’t want to be a department store,” says Sears
CEO Alan Lacy. “We want to be Sears.”
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